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Introduction
The problem of the existence of ethics based only on human reason and
independent of Revelation is one of the most discussed problems in contem-
porary ethics and moral discourse. Today, in an age of postmodernism, when
all absolute truths are rejected, especially those concerned with universal
moral norms, philosophers, especially ethicists, struggle to find common
moral principles. On the one hand, we have the attempt of Hans Küng in so-
-called Global-Ethic1, which try to identify some common moral principles in
different religious standpoints while another view is held in a document of
the International Theological Commission: The Search for Universal Ethics:
A New Look at Natural Law, which endeavours to redefine the struggle for
the search of a universal ethic in a return to theory of natural law2. This the-
ory claims that all human agents can grasp some basic truths of the moral
order, and even the most complicated or complex social order or other cir-
cumstances cannot eradicate them from the human mind. But is this theory
sufficient? For example John Calvin and other Reformers rejected the notion
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of natural law3. Of the opposite view is Immanuel Kant4 – a key figure in
Modernism who tried to interpret Christianity as essentially a moral teaching
separable from any dogmatic baggage.
In this article I want to reflect on the way in which the American scholar,
Ralph McInerny tries to respond to this appeal and to find a solution in his
interpretation of Thomas Aquinas’ idea of natural law5. As a former student
of Charles de Konick, one of the most prominent figures in so-called aristo-
telic Thomism – McInerny’s interpretation of Aquinas is based primarily on
Aristotle. What is very interesting is that his interpretation is opposed to the
views of two Thomas Aquinas scholars, (Aquinas is considered as one of the main
theoretician of natural law theory) Etienne Gilson and Jacques Maritain who
have tried in the past to undermine the value of so called philosophical ethics,
based on the work of reason only.
1. OBJECTIONS TO THE POSSIBILITIES OF ETHICS
The first of these, is espoused by Etienne Gilson who recognized Aqui-
nas first of all as a theologian. Of course he recognized in his works huge
philosophical impact, which refuted Bertrand Russell’s and Will Durant’s
idea, that nothing special happened in philosophy in the Middle Ages6. But
on the other hand, in Gilson’s understanding the philosophy of Aquinas is
embedded in theology. Aquinas developed a Christian philosophy, not to be
confused with his theology, even though it was made in the course of their
theologizing. Theology and philosophy must be distinct, but not separate. The
order of Aquinas’s philosophy is subjected to his theology7.
From that standpoint Gilson easily arrived at his conception of Christian
philosophy. Gilson’s purpose in discussing the existence of Christian philoso-
phy is to suggest that not only is Thomism a Christian philosophy, but that of
Bonaventure and Augustine is as well. This kind of Christian philosophy will
be intelligible in the light of the relationship between faith and reason. Gilson
3 See J. Calvin, Institutes of Christian Religion, trans. F.L. Battles, Grand Rapids 1986.
4 See I. Kant, Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, trans. J. R. Silber, New York 1960.
5 The main source for this article will be the book of Ralph McInerny, The Question of
Christian Ethics, Washington D.C. 1993, written lectures given in the John Paul II Institute for
Studies on Marriage and the Family. This book is the only one by this author that fully examines
the question of the existence of an ethics independent from Revelation.
6 See R. McInerny, The Question of Christian Ethics, p. 10.
7 See Ibidem, p. 10, see also: E. Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in Middle Ages, New
York 1955.
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is then suggesting that faith can be intrinsic to philosophy8. Gilson embarks
on historical research so as to examine this question. According to the works
of Paul, who spoke in his Letter to the Romans of natural moral law, or Jus-
tin, who taught that the participation of every human being, through which-
ever revelation, is a participation in the light of Christ, Gilson could validate
the claim, that there is a Christian philosophy. It is because acceptance of faith
was taken to confer philosophical advantages as well as others9. This does not
mean that „faith is a kind of cognition superior to natural cognition”10. Man
cannot proceed from premises of faith to pure science or make a transforma-
tion from faith to knowledge. Instead, the Christian philosopher asks whether
there are any truths accepted by faith that can be known by reason to be true.
Then there will be progression form faith to knowledge, and the latter can be
called Christian philosophy because of the original status of the truth of the
believer. Gilson stated that he calls Christian every philosophy, „which al-
though keeping the two orders (natural and supernatural) formally distinct,
nevertheless considers Christian revelation as an indispensable auxiliary to
reason”11. What Gilson is insisting is that the „constitution of this true philos-
ophy could not be achieved without the aid of revelation acting as an indis-
pensable moral support to the reason”12. But this provokes other problems: if
this is so then can the philosophy of Aquinas without a theological back-
ground still be called a Christian philosophy? If his philosophical ethics, with-
out the impact of grace and supernatural order is possible? Of course one has
to state that operating with insufficient knowledge of the end of every human,
ethics has a limited task. But does this limited moral philosophy have no right
to exist independent of theology? This kind of purely philosophical ethics had
little practical value for Gilson13.
Another Thomistic scholar, Jacques Maritain invented the theory of „mor-
al philosophy adequately considered”. In his understanding, purely philosoph-
ical ethics would be possible only in a state of pure nature, not concerning
the fact of Original Sin which weakened our intellectual faculties in moral
discernment. Of course Maritain acknowledged that purely philosophical
ethics could prescribe some good acts such as „tell the truth and do not lie”, but
8 See Ibid, p. 12, see also: E. Gilson, Spirit of Medieval Philosophy, trans. A. H. C. Downes,
New York 1936, p. 9.
9 See Ibidem, p. 13.
10 E. Gilson, Spirit of Medieval Philosophy, p. 35.
11 See Ibidem, p. 38.
12 See Ibidem, 40-41.
13 See V. Bourke, Moral Philosophy without Revelation, Thomist, 40 (1976), p. 555.
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the prescription of good acts is not enough to form a practical science. Mari-
tain stated: „the true science of the use of freedom not only prescribes good
actions but determines how the acting subject can live a life of consistent
goodness and organize rightly his whole universe of action”14.
Maritain in his works tried to contrast two orders: the practical and theo-
retical. In the theoretical order he acknowledges possibilities of natural theol-
ogy – we can get some information about God, perhaps this science is not
sufficient, but it is not false. Difference is in practical order. Maritain stated
about ethics that „it is essentially insufficient in the sense that no science di-
rective of human conduct – no science pure and simply worthy of the name –
can exist without taking into account the real and actual last end of human
life”15. One must take into account the actual fallen state of human beings
after original sin. Purely natural will in a state of pure nature is for Maritain
a false concept. He stated that if we want to conceptualize in a „texture of
pure reason, we will produce a false morality designed for man as he is, but
with its axis all awry”16. This position can be summed up by the statement
that „man, as he actually exists has been redeemed by Christ and called to
a happiness that exceeds his natural reach, yet it is only through faith that one
can accept this claim as true; therefore, moral directives adequate to actually
existing man must presuppose the faith”17. By that critique Maritain developed
the idea of „moral philosophy adequately considered”, which is subjected to
moral theology.
2. MCINERNYS IDEA OF INDEPENDENT ETHICS
McInerny try to reject Gilson’s and Maritain’s obstacles by reading and
commentary of Aquinas, in particular his Treatise on Law. What McInerny
first noticed was that in Aquinas’s thinking, pagan philosophers were able to
learn some truth about God which is a small package of revelation, therefore
it is possible that they could gain some knowledge of the human good, which
is in the full picture given by revelation, especially in Decalogue. McInerny
named these truths the preambles of faith in a practical order18.
14 J. Maritain, Science and Wisdom, trans. B. Wall, New York 1940, p. 162.
15 J. Maritain, Science and Wisdom, p. 165.
16 Ibidem, p. 167.
17 R. McInerny, The Question of Christian Ethics, p. 21.
18 Idem, First Glance of St. Thomas Aquinas. A Handbook for Peeping Thomists, Notre Dame
 London 1990, p. 157-158.
129IS THERE AN ETHICS INDEPENDENT FROM REVELATION
2.1. Preambula fidei
The first mention of preambula fidei is found in Summa contra gentiles.
Thomas observes two kinds of truth: the first is that we can gain from our
natural reason. These are truths such as: „God exits” or „God is one”. On the
other hand there are some truths, that God had to reveal to us, like that of the
three persons in the Trinity or that Jesus is human and divine19. They are
called mysteries of faith. As Thomas stated, preambles of faith can be known
by reason for the believer or not, Christian faith is not presupposed. As McIn-
erny noted, „Thomas, living at the time when the Physics and Metaphysics of
Aristotle became available in the West, was able to compile a list such truths
about God that the philosophers had acquired”20. Of course Maritain will ac-
knowledge his contribution and give importance to truth about God, that could
be found in theoretical reason, but he rejected this significance concerning
truths about human activity. For him practical reason and practical sciences
scarcely differ from theoretical reason and theoretical sciences21.
As a confrontation to Maritain McInerny noted, that there is Aquinas’s
parallel between practical reason to the preambles of faith in theoretical rea-
son. Through things, which God revealed, there are some precepts meant to
guide our actions, notably those included in the Decalogue. To understand
fully the significance of the precept of the Decalogue in Aquinas, McInerny
is trying to see it in the broader context of Aquinas’s Treatise on Law22.
2.2. Natural law
When Aquinas speaks of „law”, he thinks about promulgated rational or-
dination to the common good by one who has charge of the community23. This
notion is used analogously to God’s direction of the world. His plan for all
creatures is called divine law, usually equated with God’s providence. As
McInerny commented, „just as central events may be said to be rational, not
because of any reasoning on the part of physical objects, but because of the
wise ordering of the Creator, so the activities of natural entities are lawful,
not because they rationally direct themselves, but because of the wise they
are directed24”. Human participation in this eternal law Aquinas called natural
19 Thomas Aquinas, SCG, b. 1, q. 3.
20 R. McInerny, The Question of Christian Ethics, p. 42.
21 Ibidem, p. 41, see also: J. Maritain, Science and Wisdom, p. 165-166.
22 See Ibidem, p. 44, see also Thomas Aquinas, ST, I-II, q. 90-98.
23 Thomas Aquinas, ST, I-II, q. 90, a. 4.
24 R. McInerny, St. Thomas Aquinas, Notre Dame, Indiana 1982, p. 63.
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law. Thomas applied the notion of natural law to those creatures, which are
not only rationally directed, but which rationally direct themselves to an end.
The human person is one such creature25. Human beings are not merely di-
rected by divine reason – they direct themselves rationally and this self-direc-
tion involves another law, distinct from eternal law – and this we call natural
law. As we can understand natural law, man has not been given a mind sim-
ply to discover the single possible course of action open to him. We are not
forced to act in the way we do. We are capable of acting rightly or wrongly.
This indeterminacy involved is moral: good can be known by reason. The
human agent in his moral investigation pursues happiness as a fulfilling end.
The most general starting points of this moral endeavour can be found in the
precepts of natural law26. It is law appropriate to our nature and prescriptive
judgments which talks about what is good for our nature and can really per-
fect it. What McInerny insisted on was that Aquinas identified natural law
with the first precepts of practical reason,
the nongainsayable truths that mark the limit of moral discourse. These common and
naturally known first principles are latent or implicit in particular moral judgments
that are discursively arrived it. These principles are thus said to preside over moral
philosophy in general  over ethics, domestic governance, political action, and of
course civil law27.
These kind of judgments human beings are supposed to know naturally,
easily. That’s why Aquinas enumerates only several precepts of natural law.
The first of these can be deduced from an analogy between the most ba-
sic precepts of theoretical order. In theoretical knowledge there is a rule of
contradiction: the same thing cannot be affirmed and denied at the same time.
The same one can observe in the practical order: good is the primary concept
in the practical use of our mind. The good is what all men seek so we can
come to the first principle of practical reason: „good is to be done and pur-
sued, and evil is to be avoided”. As we see, the first principle of practical
reason is grounded in knowledge of the notion of goodness; this means the
good is that which all things seek. This is what „good” is taken to mean, just
as „being” means that we exist28. As McInerny commented on Aquinas: „this
good does not simply designate an object of pursuit, but rather gives some
kind of formality under which the object is pursued as being completive or
25 See Thomas Aquinas ST, I-II, q. 91, a. 2.
26 R. McInerny, St Thomas Aquinas, p. 64.
27 Idem, The Question of Christian Ethics, p. 45.
28 See Idem, Ethica Thomistica, Washington D.C. 1982, p. 42.
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perfective. Whatever is done is done under the formality of the good, that is,
with the thought that it is perfective and fulfilling the agent29”. But what is
the criterion for inclusion in the precepts of natural law? The order of pre-
cepts of natural law follows that of natural inclinations.
2.3. Natural inclinations
The first inclination, according to the nature shared with all substances,
every human agent seeks to conserve itself in existence according to its na-
ture. That is why humans naturally try to preserve their lives. The second
inclination, according to nature shared with animal is joining between hus-
band and wife, education of children and the like.
The third inclination, characteristic only for rational creatures, is that man
has a natural inclination to know the truth of God and live in society30. Incli-
nations are not precepts of natural law themselves. Their presence within us
helps with immediate access to some types of good, of objects of desire of
inclination31. What McInerny insisted on was that we understand these goods
as human beings, not as a kind animal instinct. The second inclination, which
tells us that we are inclined to have sexual intercourse and have offspring does
not mean that in our sexual lives we can behave like brute animals. We must
acknowledge our reason in every action, and every fulfillment of inclination
has to have a personal and reasonable dimension. One must also take into
account, that we must seek a knowledge of context of our deeds and that the
rights of the others are to be respected would be suggestive of the first and
immediate judgments which guide human actions32.
One must acknowledge that precepts of natural law are some kind of gen-
eral directives to the ultimate end, aiming at constituents of the human good.
Thanks to the fact that, in every human action the agent recognizes a striving
for the ultimate end, natural law is valid for all men and all times. What must
be emphasized is that natural law claims that there are moral absolutes. It
is an absolute moral principle-judgment or precept – that informs us what is
good for us and what we must not do which admits of no exceptions33. If we
consider some negative precepts such as: „Thou shalt not murder” or „Thou
shall not steal ”we can easily get to the point that in no way we can murder
29 See Ibidem, p. 44.
30 See ST, I-II, q. 94, a. 2, see also R. McInerny, Ethica Thomistica, p. 45.
31 R. McInerny, St. Thomas Aquinas, p. 66.
32 See Ibidem, p. 67.
33 See R. McInerny, Ethica Thomistica, p. 47.
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well, steal well or commit adultery well. Apart from negative precepts we can
of course gain some positive conclusions. Be just. Be generous. These pre-
cepts are perhaps not very specific but at least they call the human being to
the moral ideal. One can notice that precepts like: „Thou shalt not murder” or
„Thou shall not steal” can be found in the Decalogue. What is for Aquinas
then the status of the Decalogue and why did McInerny name them „pream-
bula fidei of practical order”?
2.4. Decalogue
In Aquinas’s Treatise on Law the Decalogue is a manifestation of the Old
Law – part of law that was given to the Jews in the Old Covenant. But what
McInerny emphasised in reading Aquinas is the fact, that the Decalogue is
directly connected with natural law. McInerny repeated Aquinas’s statement
that the „Old Law manifested precepts of natural law, to which it added
a number of special precepts. Consequently, with respect to that of natural law
that the Old Law contains, all were held to the observance of Old Law, not
because they were (precepts) of the Old Law, but because they pertain to nat-
ural law”34. That one can see, that the Old Law contains precepts not only
peculiar to the chosen nation, Israelites, but also precepts of natural law. We
can judge our acts by fitting them with reason. In such a case evil acts be-
come discordant with reason. Just as we can discover some basic principles
in speculative order, for example the rule of non-contradiction, we can find
the same in practical order. As McInerny notes: „Some things about human
acts are so obvious that they can be approved or rejected right off; judgments
about other acts require intense inquiry into their different circumstances, and
not everyone is equipped for such inquiry: yet other things are such that man
needs the help of divine instruction in order to judge, as in matters of faith”35.
Thanks to this statement one can find the existence of precepts, which pertain
to natural law, for example „honour thy father or mother” or „do not kill”.
Other moral precepts are arrived at discursively from natural law precepts, and
pertain to natural law only in that sense, as derived from it. But why are these
kinds of precepts were revealed in the Decalogue? McInerny once again in-
vokes Aquinas: „among the things proposed for our belief are not only those
which reason cannot attain such as that God is triune, but also those which
34 Thomas Aquinas, ST, I-II, q. 100, a. 1, see also: R. McInerny, The Question of Christian
Ethics, p. 46.
35 R. McInerny, The Question of Christian Ethics, p. 47, see also: Thomas Aquinas ST, I-II, q.
100, a. 1.
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right reason can grasp, such as that God is one, for the exclusion of human
reason’s error, which occurs in many”36. Sinful practice can obscure both com-
mon moral precepts as well as more particular ones, so divine aid, by the di-
vine authority of the Decalogue was necessary.
McInerny further pointed out that: „Some law of course is made by man,
some by God – but there is as well the natural law, also deriving from God,
as nature itself does”37. We can gain major precepts of natural law using our
reason. We have this notion of right practical reason, which says to us: „do
good, avoid evil”. So, for example, no murderer can excuse himself by say-
ing that he rejected the Bible and Ten Commandments. Murder is always
some destruction of society and because natural law has to preserve common
good, it also protects life of every citizen38. The same is directed to our other
actions, especially these conducted through our natural inclinations. My de-
sire to eat and drink is not law unto itself, but should be governed by my
mind. The same with sex – without using reason sexual intercourse becomes
only a physical act, definitely non human. Human agents must put an intel-
lectual consideration into choosing actions to fulfill those natural inclinations,
which are grounded in natural law39.
As mentioned earlier, these moral principles, found in the Decalogue –
just as preambula fidei, are close to being self-evident, following directly from
principles that are self-evident. Of course divine sanction was needed for the
sinfulness of men, but by its nature these precepts do not require God’s inter-
vention40. In this statement McInerny saw one of key arguments for the Cath-
olic Church to be a defender of natural law. (As previously mentioned, Calvin
and the Reformers rejected theory of natural law; the Eastern Churches have
not developed this theory). McInerny stressed that the Catholic Church con-
stantly used arguments from natural law in documents like Humanae vitae,
Donum vitae and others. Of course natural law is not a theological doctrine.
Neither does it suggest that the acceptance of some moral norms is dependent
on religious faith41. McInerny tries to show that
in times, when people think that it is not possible to reach practical agreement in
moral principles, and all moral theories try transform moral principles as simply
expressions of subjectivity with no objective basis to it, it is more than important to
36 Thomas Aquinas, ST, I-II, q. 99, a. 2, ad 2.
37 R. McInerny, Handbook for Peeping Thomists, p. 159.
38 See Ibidem, p. 159.
39 See Ibidem, p. 159.
40 See R. McInerny, The Question of Christian Ethics, p. 63.
41 See Ibidem, p. 52.
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try to find in natural law some common agreement of moral rights that human agents
will be able supposed to follow42.
3. SOME CRITICAL REMARKS
First of all, one can notice that the cases of preambula fidei and practical
order are not on the same footing. In the first a believer has a sanction exter-
nal to and prior to philosophy. Then he has to produce some proof if he ex-
pects the approval of a non-believer. In practical order things go differently.
It is not simply that one claims extra philosophical sanction for moral pre-
cepts naturally knowable. Natural law requires that the non-believer accepts
the existence of God. Now we must confront two objections. Aquinas de-
scribes natural law as a participation in eternal law, which can be equated with
God’s providence. How is it possible for the non-believer to believe such
a thing?43 Secondly, from the precepts of natural law that Aquinas distinguish-
es, one can find the injunction that we are to pursue knowledge of God. It is
difficult to see how a non-believer could accept the presumption that God
is to be known. In this case natural law presupposes, what is non-evident44.
In answer to the first objection, the theory of natural law claims that there
are certain practical judgments any agent can be expected to make. These
judgments are based on the work of practical reason and the theological de-
scription of natural law does not require that every agent is expected to know
that description. „The core of theory is that every person, sophisticated or not,
bears within him the wherewithal to distinguish good from evil”45.
According to second objection, if natural law theory presupposes a natu-
ral inclination to know God we can say that this statement must be under-
stood in a strict way. God is the ultimate end of human life and everything is
made for His sake. So generally one might have the impression that knowl-
edge of Him is presupposed in moral life. On the other hand Aquinas wrote
in his commentary on Boethius De Trinitate:
It should be said that although God is the ultimate end attained and the first in inten-
tion of natural appetite, it isnt necessary that he be first in the knowledge of the hu-
man mind that is ordered to the end, but on the knowledge of the one ordering, as in
42 See Ibidem, p. 64.
43 See Ibidem, p. 65.
44 See Ibidem, p. 65.
45 See Ibidem, p. 66.
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other things that tend to the end by natural appetite. He is, however, known as the
mind desires well being and to live well, which it will have only when it has God46.
As McInerny finds, „God, who is unrestricted, infinite existence, is known
implicitly whenever any existent thing is known; so too, the desire for any
good thing, any participated goodness, is an implicit desire for essential good-
ness”47. When Aquinas talks about natural inclination of knowing God, he is
just saying: „Seek knowledge, avoid ignorance”.
The other objection to natural law is the problem of the so called natural
fallacy. McInerny writes that, we live in times of general scepticism about
moral absolutes, where there is some presumption, that practical and moral
order must be autonomous. When we try to understand, what „natural law
morality” is, people not familiar with that notion think that this is taking rules
from nature. Hume objected to the transition from „is” to „ought”. He called
it a naturalistic fallacy48. Let’s therefore, turn to Aristotle. We can find in his
teaching the notion of four orders: „There is a certain order that reason does
not construct but only considers, such as the order of natural objects. There is
another order which reason introduces by considering its own activity, as
when it relates concepts among themselves and the signs of concepts which
are signifying sounds. Third is the order reason introduces into acts of will.
Fourth is the order reason imposes on eternal things of which it is the cause,
as in a chest or house49”. Natural philosophy here stands for the first order,
logic or rational philosophy stands for the second order, the third order is the
concern of moral philosophy, the fourth pertains to the mechanical acts. Here
we want to raise the question as to whether, we can see dependence between
first and third order, metaphysics and moral philosophy.
When we try to show a dependence between ethics and metaphysics it is
not an easy task, as anyone, in order to know what he ought to do or be, must
first become a metaphysician. Moral knowledge does not presuppose knowl-
edge of metaphysics or indeed any theoretical knowledge. What is important
is that „no more should the theory of natural law be taken to be what anyone
is said already to know about what he ought to do”50. If we have in mind the
content of natural law, the truths that constitute it, then not only is knowledge
of it possible without metaphysics, but even without ethics or moral philoso-
46 Thomas Aquinas, In Boethii de Trinitate, q. 1, a. 3, ad 4.
47 R. McInerny, The Question of Christian Ethics, p. 67.
48 See R. McInerny, Aquinas on Human Action, Washington D.C. 1992, p. 193.
49 Thomas Aquinas, Sententia libri Ethicorum, l. 1.
50 R. McInerny, Aquinas on Human Action, p. 198.
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phy. This is not equal to the statement that moral knowledge is independent
of knowledge of the way things are. When any human agent knows what to
do, this knowledge entails knowledge of the sort of agent he is. Practical
knowledge is always an extension of theoretical knowledge51.
How one can prove this? In the Questiones Disputate de Veritate, Tho-
mas recalls that the idea of being is the first thing which reason grasps. Then
he went to conclude that: „hence all other conceptions of the intellect must be
taken as adding to being”52. The concept of good is among those others, so
good must presuppose yet add to being in some way. He goes on to discuss
the various ways in which truth adds to being. The most authoritative frag-
ment is where Aquinas has made reference to Aristotle Metaphysics V, the
second article: „secondly being is perfective of another not only with respect
to the grasp of its species, but also with respect to real existence, and in this
way good is perfective and conservative of the existence of another, it has the
notion of end with respect to what it perfects”53. From this passage one can
see that good includes the understanding of being. As McInerny stated, any
per se notum principle other than the first presupposes the first54. In this way
it has been shown that there is a connection between practical and theoretical
order.
4. RESPONSE TO GILSON
As previously mentioned in this article, Etienne Gilson saw the Christian
philosopher as one who develops rational arguments for conclusions already
accepted on the basis of faith. McInerny writes that „Gilson’s Christian phi-
losophy stresses the provenance of certain truths, not their status as philosoph-
ically established”55. He held the view that all philosophical truths are ground-
ed in rationality, yet „revelation” is „indispensable” as a support to reason in
the pursuit of these truths. „In his understanding of Christian philosophy he
suggested a version of Thomism that would bring all philosophical thinking
under the influence of the faith, including, of course, philosophical ethics”56.
But on the other hand if it is serious to doubt that even if some philosophical
truths were discovered by Christians, inspired by their faith, do these truths,
51 Ibidem, p. 198.
52 Thomas Aquinas, Questiones Disputate de Veritate, q. 1, a. 1.
53 Thomas Aquinas, Questiones Disputate de Veritate, q. 21, a. 1.
54 R. McInerny, Aquinas on Human Action, p. 206.
55 Idem, The Question of Christian Ethics, p. 19.
56 Ibidem, p. 21.
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once acquired, depend only on philosophical principles needed to sustain
them?57 Gilson sometimes seems to be suggesting that this is the case. What
is more in his opinion, the philosophy of Aquinas could not survive alone
without any theological background.
McInerny responded that this claim could be upheld in the case of saint
Bonaventure, but not Thomas. In Aquinas we have a very clear notion of how
he treated philosophy and other constitutive sciences. When we read Aqui-
nas’s commentary we see all his responses and development to almost all
philosophical areas58. McInerny makes reference to another Thomistic schol-
ar, father Chenu, who talking about these commentaries, showed how Aqui-
nas as a commentator made an effort to explain them and assimilate philo-
sophical science59. Therefore all the forms of philosophical developments,
arguments and achievements, that we find in theological writings, without
their theological background, we have a place to put them. We can see them
as Thomas’s contribution to philosophical sciences, based mainly on Aristo-
tle60. In this case truly philosophical ethics, based only on Stagirite gain the
right to exist independently as a logical and complete theory.
5. RESPONSE TO MARITAIN
It is right to once again confront Maritain’s idea of „moral philosophy
adequately considered”, in which philosophical ethics must be subjected to
moral theology. McInerny remarked, „it would be maintained that, although
man has been called to a higher, supernatural end, this elevation of his nature
does not destroy it, so that it remains possible to come to knowledge of the
good perfective of the human agent and to formulate directives in the light of
that natural end61”. What he insisted on was that we can undertake the ques-
tion, if for example, Aristotle’s ethics precluded human elevation to the su-
pernatural end. When Plato and Aristotle talk about human goodness and hap-
piness, are their answers really contradictory to the Christian faith? Perhaps
this philosophical answer will be inadequate, but not false.
Can Aristotelian ethics really compete with moral theology? In Science
and Wisdom this problem was not especially developed by Maritain. This
57 See Ibidem, p. 49.
58 See Ibidem, p. 49.
59 See Ibidem, see also: M. D. Chenu, Introduction à létude de Saint Thomas dAquino, Paris,
1954, p. 173-198.
60 See Ibidem, p. 49-50.
61 Ibidem, p. 21.
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would lead us to question whether Maritain’s reconstruction of Aristotle is
justified62. What is interesting, and even Maritain in his works noted the fact,
that such precepts such as „do not steal” or „do not lie” can be deduced from
Aristotle’s ethics. This it would perhaps suggest a degree of inadequacy in his
thought since he rejected the possibilities of philosophical ethics. Even if we
take into account that human nature was depraved by original sin, is it justifi-
able that a sinner is incapable of a naturally good action? As McInerny stat-
ed, „if it is granted that philosophical ethics can give true advice as how to
man, naturally considered, can act well, that would seem to be a more than
sufficient basis for the claim that a philosophical ethics is possible – possible
because it is actual. Ab esse posse valet illation”63. And one must take the
difference between practical sciences, that can show the path of a morally
good life from the dispositions of that life, as, for example, prudence or other
moral virtues. As we have seen in passages on the Old Law, corruption by sin
caused God’s revelation of truth that could be undertaken by human beings
from natural law. However, the doctrine of natural law does not assume the
standpoint that any and every human agent, no matter the moral quality of his
life, can straight off and without any trouble grasp the truth of such precepts
as those of the Decalogue, even though these principles present no difficulty
to the mind of one pursuing good. In Thomas’ teaching we can find passages
that suggest that we have been wounded in the intellectual, and even more in
practical order. Complex situations and circumstances often confuse us about
principles that supposed to be self-evident. To remedy this, we need the help
of grace to achieve even imperfect happiness, recognized for example by
Aristotle64. From Treatise on Grace we are informed, that without grace the
human agent cannot avoid serious sin. What is more, in Treatise on Virtues
one is informed that mankind may achieve acquired virtues, which are not
even virtues in the right sense.
Nevertheless, after careful study of the Second Part of Summa Theologiae,
from human nature we can formulate great nongainsayable truths about hu-
man good65. McInerny concluded his moral investigation writing that
such truths are implicit in any particular decision; their articulation is of value since
they suggest that, despite the contingency and continuous alteration of the circum-
stances in which we act, despite the historical changes that make one century so dif-
ferent from another, there are absolutes of human action; some goods that will ever
62 Ibidem, p. 22.
63 Ibidem, p. 51.
64 R. McInerny, Ethica Thomistica, p. 119.
65 See Ibidem, p. 120.
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be constitutive of the human moral ideal, some kinds of action that are always de-
structive of the human good. This is the conviction that Thomas develops in his the-
ory of natural law66.
6. CONCLUSION
As discussed in the article, Ralph McInerny gives his idea of independent
ethics, mainly based on his understanding, commentary and reappropriation
of Aquinas’s natural law. This vision is opposed to that of other Thomistic
scholars like Etienne Gilson and Jacques Maritain, who have tried to mini-
malize the role of moral philosophy in favour of moral theology. By analyz-
ing the thoughts of Aquinas, McInerny became convinced, that in practical
philosophy Aquinas gave so much importance to the working of practical rea-
son, precepts of natural law and natural inclination that one can find in Chris-
tianity the possibility of the existence of independent ethics from moral the-
ology. The foundation for this idea is the conviction that basic moral norms
can be rationally deduced from natural law, without any influence of Revela-
tion. By analogy, as we can grasp the first intellectual principle in theoretical
order, in the same way moral good can be found in the practical order. As
shown earlier, in this theory we can also find very strict dependence on a the-
oretical and practical order, which is an effort to overcome the problem of the
naturalistic fallacy.
McInerny’s outlook provides a very important and significant voice in the
present time of post-modern refusals of moral absolutes and truths. It tries to
show a universal application of natural law in finding moral commonplaces
for every person, believer or non-believer, wise or not wise. It appeals to the
work of our reason, our nature and our natural strivings. But what is most
important, his idea can offer a powerful defence of natural law theory, which
is crucial for the Church’s moral teaching, and its attempts to find general
nongainsayable judgments, common for every person in a morally complex
world.
66 Ibidem, p. 121.
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STRESZCZENIE
Ralph McInerny, bazuj¹c na swej interpretacji teorii prawa naturalnego Tomasza z Akwinu,
wychodzi z interesuj¹c¹ teori¹ etyki niezale¿nej wzglêdem objawienia. McInerny sw¹ teoriê opiera
na przekonaniu, ¿e tak jak rozum mo¿e poznaæ podstawowe zasady w porz¹dku teoretycznym, tak
jest on w stanie uchwyciæ takowe zasady w porz¹dku praktycznym. Teoria ta stara siê byæ mocn¹
obron¹ teorii prawa naturalnego, która szuka niezmiennych, etycznych zasad w z³o¿onym moralnie
postmodernistycznym wiecie.
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